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AbstrACt
Objective The benefits of internal whistleblowing or 
speaking-up in the healthcare sector are significant. The a 
priori assumption that employee whistleblowing is always 
beneficial is, however, rarely examined. While recent research 
has begun to consider how the complex nature of healthcare 
institutions impact speaking-up rates, few have investigated 
the institutional processes and factors that facilitate or retard 
the benefits of speaking up. Here we consider how the 
efficacy of formal inquiries within organisations in response to 
employees’ speaking up about their concerns affects the utility 
of internal whistleblowing.
Design Using computational models, we consider how 
best to improve patient care through internal whistleblowing 
when resource and practical limitations constrain healthcare 
operation. We analyse the ramifications of varying 
organisational responses to employee concerns, given 
organisational and practical limitations.
setting Drawing on evidence from international research, 
we test the utility of whistleblowing policies in a variety of 
organisational settings. This includes institutions where 
whistleblowing inquiries are handled with varying rates of 
efficiency and accuracy.
results We find organisational inefficiencies can negatively 
impact the benefits of speaking up about bad patient care. We 
find that, given resource limitations and review inefficiencies, 
it can actually improve patient care if whistleblowing rates 
are limited. However, we demonstrate that including softer 
mechanisms for internal adjustment of healthcare practice (eg, 
peer to peer conversation) alongside whistleblowing policy can 
overcome these organisational limitations.
Conclusion Healthcare organisations internationally have 
a variable record of responding to employees who speak up 
about their workplace concerns. Where organisations get 
this wrong, the consequences can be serious for patient care 
and staff well-being. The results of this study, therefore, have 
implications for researchers, policy makers and healthcare 
organisations internationally. We conclude with a call for 
further research on a more holistic understanding of the 
interplay between organisational structure and the benefits of 
whistleblowing to patient care.
IntrODuCtIOn
The act of employees reporting poor practice 
has been variously labelled as whistleblowing, 
‘raising concerns’ or ‘speaking up’. The use 
of the latter two terms have become more 
commonly used within healthcare, as the term 
whistleblowing is often regarded as having 
negative connotations related to ‘grassing’ 
or ‘snitching’ on colleagues.1 2 The terms 
are often used interchangeably (as we do 
here), as seen in the current National Health 
Service (NHS) policy document in this area 
titled ‘Freedom to speak up: raising concerns 
(whistleblowing) policy for the NHS’.3 
This paper focuses on employees who whis-
tleblow, or speak up, internally within their 
organisations when they witness poor care, 
rather than speaking up to external organi-
sations such as healthcare regulators or law 
enforcement agencies. Poor care has been 
defined as involving acts of neglect, abuse or 
incompetence and should be differentiated 
from error which is the unintended conse-
quence of a genuine mistake or mistakes.4
The frequency with which poor care occurs 
within healthcare is difficult to measure or 
predict, and any attempt at estimation is 
hampered by complexity and that healthcare 
employees have long reported reluctance in 
raising concerns within the organisations in 
which they work. For example, recent inqui-
ries into systematic failings in the UK health-
care sector5–7 suggest that incidents of poor 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This work uses computer simulations to test the util-
ity of several whistleblowing policies in a variety of 
organisational contexts. This methodology offers a 
fast and cheap mechanism for detecting potential 
problems in implementing whistleblowing policy.
 ► This work is one of the first to use simulations to 
analyse the repercussions of whistleblowing policy 
when report resolution is constrained by time, accu-
racy and effectiveness.
 ► All models will oversimplify the complex dynamics 
of a working healthcare institution. The below mod-
els suggest that certain policy may require organisa-
tional restructuring to maximise its utility. However, 
empirical study is required to diagnosis whether ex-
isting healthcare organisations are as vulnerable as 
the models suggest.
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care of the most egregious type occurred on multiple 
occasions, in multiple settings, over a prolonged period 
of time. In addition, a survey of nearly 1600 nurses found 
that 73% of respondents felt they were too understaffed 
to provide safe, dignified and compassionate care.8
Whistleblowing in healthcare
In the healthcare sector, few disagree that care is improved 
where employees are able, willing and supported within 
their organisation to speak up about poor care. In the 
long term, employee internal whistleblowing may even 
prove cost-effective to the institution.9 10 Despite this, 
employee internal whistleblowing is still not ubiquitous.11 
Whistleblowing rates differ by nation states,12–14 work-
place culture15–17 and organisational topography.1 18 For 
example, employee surveys show that whistleblowing 
rates are correlated to the perceived efficacy of and insti-
tutional/managerial response to reporting.19 20 Similarly, 
more proximate sociocultural workplace dynamics and a 
sense of loyalty to work colleagues have also been shown 
to negatively affect whistleblowing behaviour.2
Unfortunately, employees’ hesitation to report poor 
practice is often warranted, as whistleblowers face bullying 
by colleagues, negative emotional/physiological effects 
and job loss.21–25 Health employees appear cognizant of 
these dire consequences and often refuse to whistleblow 
for fear of reprisal and an apprehension about the efficacy 
of reporting.26–28 As a consequence, significant research, 
policy and legislation has sought to curb such reprisals 
and to protect whistleblowers.29–34 The implication being 
that improved protection will always lead to an increase 
in whistleblowing and a subsequent reduction in poor 
practice leading to benefits to patient care and employee 
well-being.
Given all the moving parts of an institution, it has been 
argued that culpability for the lack of whistleblowing 
cannot be placed solely on the healthcare worker.35 
However, while research and governmental inquiries 
have provided insights into the complex nature of health-
care institutions and the cultural factors that inhibit 
whistleblowing, surprisingly little empirical work has 
considered how internal institutional processes could 
actually inhibit or promote the benefits of employees 
speaking up.
Promoting whistleblowing in the workplace: an exemplar
A notable success story in terms of an institutional attempt 
to increase the numbers of concerns raised internally 
by employees comes from the Virginia Mason Medical 
Center (VMMC) in Seattle, USA. In 2002, VMMC intro-
duced the Patient Safety Act (PSA) system following a 
staff survey that showed that most employees believed that 
if they raised concerns they would be punished and that 
information generated from concerns would not improve 
the safety of care. The PSA system encourages employees 
to report actual safety lapses (such as medical errors) and 
near misses in safety and also all events that could impact 
on the safety and well-being of a patient. As a result of 
the introduction of the PSA system, from March 2002 to 
January 2014 staff raised concerns a total of 43 615 times. 
This has grown from an annual reporting frequency of 
10 or so concerns a year in the period 2002–2004 to 850 
concerns a month in January 2014. As a result, between 
2004 and 2014, there was a 74% reduction in insurance 
liability premiums paid by staff, indicating a major shift in 
‘risk perception’ by insurers. Factors underpinning this 
success include the introduction of a learning culture, 
where instead of criticising or silencing employees who 
speak up, managers and executives were trained to offer 
support and resources to fix issues that concerned staff. 
In addition, VMMC openly share with staff information 
about how their concerns have led to improved safety 
outcomes and how, rather than victimising those who 
speak up, employees who raise concerns are welcomed 
and valued.36
Although there is little in the way of robust research 
that evaluates the success of the PSA system, the Depart-
ment of Health in England cite VMMC as an institution 
worthy of imitation for using ‘openness to drive a safer 
culture of care’37 (p. 8). In an attempt to generate similar 
levels of openness and organisational learning, NHS 
England announced a number of strategies to encourage 
employees to raise concerns.38 These include the intro-
duction in 2015 of ‘Freedom to Speak Up Guardians’ 
(FTSUGs) situated in each NHS organisation, supported 
by a National Freedom to Speak Up Guardian team, 
who together are tasked with making the raising and 
addressing of employee concerns ‘normal practice’ 
(p. 71) throughout the NHS.
In the near total absence of published studies or 
descriptions of similar initiatives, the introduction of 
FTSUGs is founded on a variety of assumptions that raise 
a host of interesting questions. For example, if the drive 
to normalise employee speaking up as routine practice is 
successful then:
 ► Will patient care improve?
 ► Are resources within the system able to cope with 
potentially hundreds or thousands of complaints per 
month?
 ► What are the effects, if any, of any delays in responding 
to concerns on patient care and on employees’ 
propensity to raise concerns in the future?
In relation to the second question, it is worth recalling 
that VMMC, a relatively modest healthcare organisation 
consisting of one 350 bed hospital facility and nine satel-
lite units employing 5000 staff, received over 800 reports 
of concern from staff in January 2014, although after 
12 years of promoting and raising awareness of their 
employee concerns system. Here we set out to analyse 
how such an increase in whistleblowing rates can affect 
both the patients and the institution.
In this paper, we explore the limits of the a priori 
assumption that internal whistleblowing to workplace 
colleagues, line managers or administrators always 
augments the quality and safety of patient care. To answer 
these questions, we develop an agent-based mathematical 
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model that considers the effects of whistleblowing on 
patient care. The employment of mathematical and 
computational modelling to investigate policy initiatives 
has long been employed in many sectors but, to date, has 
been underused in the healthcare arena.39 Applying such 
tools permits us to validate hypotheses without signifi-
cant cost, or at a scale and rate that would be difficult 
to achieve with conventional research methods. In addi-
tion to addressing some taken-for-granted assumptions 
about employee whistleblowing, the results of testing the 
model will also expedite conversation between policy 
bodies, regulators and those charged with supporting 
whistleblowing in practice.
MethODs
Patient and public involvement
In this work, we use computational models to attempt to 
better understand the repercussions of policy and organ-
isational structure on the utility of speaking up. This 
method did not involve public participants or patients.
Model overview
Here we model the utility of informational transpar-
ency and whistleblowing in the healthcare sector. For 
the purposes of this study, the healthcare institution is 
composed of the following variables:
 ► Patients.
 ► Healthcare workers.
 ► The practices employed by the healthcare workers that 
affect patient care.
The model is initialised with 20 000 workers, where 90% 
of practice is good and 10% of practice is bad. The game 
is partitioned into 10 000 rounds. During a round of play, 
the following events occur in order:
round
1. With some likelihood i (informational transparency), 
a healthcare worker receives information about a co-
worker’s practice (eg, through working alongside and 
observing coworker’s practice).
2. If the worker believes the practice is poor, they raise 
concerns internally and demand an internal inquiry 
with probability w (propensity to whistleblow).
3. When a whistleblowing report is filed, then the inquiry 
is added to the investigation list.
4. Whistleblowing inquiries are resolved.
5. Finally, patients receive care. We assume that patients 
receive care equal to the fraction of good practice in 
the institution.
Filing and resolving whistleblowing inquiries
When the whistle is blown on a practice, a report is filed 
and added to the list of current whistleblowing investi-
gations within the institution. Each investigation takes 
X=100 rounds to finish. We presume the inquiry is 100% 
accurate in its appraisal of the practice. If the inquiry is 
the result of bad practice, then the practice is immediately 
removed from the institution and replaced with good 
practice.
The investigation list contains all the practices currently 
under investigation. Each inquiry has a counter repre-
senting the number of rounds left until the investigation 
is complete. For example, if three practices are currently 
under investigation, then the list might appear as:
 ► Practice ID #145: 45 rounds left before completion.
 ► Practice ID #2395: 3 rounds left before completion.
 ► Practice ID #89: 100 rounds left (just added to the 
list).
After each round of play, a round is subtracted from the 
number left until each investigation on the list has been 
completed. When the counter reaches zero for a practice, 
it is resolved, and the practice is set to good, improving 
patient care. The Matlab code used to run all simulations 
can be found in online supplementary material A and B.
Analysing the results
After 10 000 rounds of the game, the average number 
of good practices in the institution is calculated over all 
rounds. This represents the average patient care at the 
institution. The game is run for different parameter 
values, and the best model for patient care is analysed.
Model 1: the (utopic) baseline
Here we consider how patient care is affected by both 
informational transparency within the institution 
(i=[0,1]) and the propensity to whistleblow (w=[0,1]). If 
i<1, then there is a lack of informational transparency in 
the institution; workers do not always know the practices 
of their colleagues. If w<1, then workers do not always 
speak up when witnessing poor practice. We consider 
patient care over all possible values of i and w, analysing 
how differing values of transparency mixes with varying 
rates of whistleblowing to affect patient care.
Results
Figure 1 represents patient care over a parameter 
sweep of i and w. The colour shade depicts patient care. 
Clearly, patients receive the best care (the lightest shaded 
Figure 1 Average patient care after 10 000 rounds.
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area) when information is transparent (i=1) and when 
employees always raise concerns (w=1).
Discussion
These results support the presumption that informational 
transparency and speaking-up both increase patient care. 
Patient care is best where employees’ practices are fully 
transparent to others and employees within an organisa-
tion have a propensity to raise concerns.
Model 2: finite resources: when patient care is improved by 
not speaking up and obfuscation of information
The previous model presumes that the time taken to 
review an inquiry is independent of the number of 
reviews currently being processed. This is not a practical 
assumption when resources are finite. For example, if 
resources are committed to looking into practice A, it may 
delay the inquiry into practice B. Here, we consider the 
repercussions of finite resources on patient care. When-
ever an employee speaks up and adds a new practice to 
the inquiry list, a 10% increase in time is added to each 
inquiry. Since it takes 100 rounds to resolve an inquiry, 
a 10% increase means that 10 rounds are added to each 
inquiry in the list.
For example, presume the current inquiry list is:
 ► Practice ID #145: 45 rounds left.
 ► Practice ID #2395: 3 rounds left.
 ► Practice ID #89: 100 rounds left.
If a healthcare worker raises concerns on another prac-
tice, then the resulting list would appear as:
 ► Practice ID #145: 55 rounds left.
 ► Practice ID #2395: 13 rounds left.
 ► Practice ID #89: 110 rounds left.
 ► Practice ID #9845: 130 rounds left.
Ten rounds are added to each existing inquiry. Further-
more, the new inquiry (ID #9845) starts with 100+30 
rounds, because 30 rounds are added for each pre-ex-
isting inquiry already on the list.
Results
As a result of adding a 10% delay, figure 2 illustrates that 
informational transparency and frequent whistleblowing 
inhibit the correction of bad practice. If information is 
transparent (i=1), then patient care is best if workers 
only report their concerns at a rate of approximately 
50%–60% of all poor practice observed. Furthermore, 
if policy dictates that every employee should speak up 
whenever they witness poor practice (w=1), then it is best 
for patient care if information is partially obfuscated, with 
workers only receiving and/or responding to information 
about a bad practice with a frequency of 50%–60%.
Discussion
Model 2 shows that while raising concerns leads to the 
eventual improvement of a practice, where there are 
finite resources, it also delays internal investigation into 
existing and future employee concerns. This is problem-
atic, as delays prolong the amount of time that potentially 
damaging practices are in circulation. Delays may also 
result in staff becoming disillusioned with a lack of timely 
response, possibly concluding that the organisation is 
uninterested in their concerns.
Delays and employee disillusionment can quickly be 
communicated to other employees potentially resulting 
in disenchantment.40 Paradoxically, therefore, occasion-
ally not observing/learning about a bad practice (ie, 
lack of transparency), or not whistleblowing may lead to 
improved patient care through more timely resolution of 
and learning from existing investigations.
It is worth noting that delaying the resolution of an 
investigation by 10% is rather small. If we presume that 
the institution’s resources for investigating concerns is 
static, then the percentage delay would be 100%. Further-
more, we are presuming that the resources required to 
maintain an impressive efficiency of 10% does not nega-
tively impact the resources employed for direct patient 
care. Both assumptions are fairly generous, but even at 
10%, it is still not efficient enough to overcome the utility 
of failing to speak up or informational obfuscation.
In the healthcare sector, significant research, regulation 
and policy imperatives have sought to increase the rates 
of speaking up by employees and informational transpar-
ency. Here we demonstrate that increasing formal whis-
tleblowing rates may not always prove beneficial within 
a context where resources are finite, as delays can occur 
in organisational learning and subsequent correction of 
existing bad practice. Yet, issues of resourcing are seldom 
discussed in the context of speaking up. This may be 
explained by recent health policy focusing on ensuring 
workplace cultures that promote and support internal 
employee speak-up cultures, with little focus on the 
resources required to respond to concerns. For example, 
the aforementioned FTSUG initiative in NHS England, if 
successful, may lead to the normalisation of speaking-up 
as a workplace activity. This is likely to increase resource 
demand within organisations to meet the requirement of 
investigating the increased numbers of concerns being 
raised. However, no additional resources have been 
provided for this activity at a time where NHS England 
is experiencing severe financial pressures.41 This may 
Figure 2 Average patient care after 10 000 rounds when 
inquiry time is increased by 10% per additional review.
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account for 51% of FTSUGs reporting having no ring-
fenced time to undertake the role, with over 70% having 
1 day or less.42
The result of the model presented here suggests that 
even in a world where successful implementation of 
FTSUGs mean that whistleblowers do not fear sanc-
tions, it may not be in the institution’s or patients’ best 
interest if employees always formally speak up internally. 
If resources are even slightly constrained, some reduction 
in internal speaking up may produce better patient care 
by enabling existing investigations into bad practices to 
be resolved more quickly. This adds credence to the idea 
that the effects of whistleblowing cannot be considered in 
isolation43 and that organisation topography may impact 
the efficacy of internal reviews.18
Model 3: more efficient reviews
In this model, we delve into the underlying mechanisms 
of model 2 and demonstrate how additional resourcing 
or other means of achieving increased efficiency in 
processing inquiries empowers whistleblowing and infor-
mational transparency. Previously, each inquiry took 100 
rounds to process. Now, we reduce the number of rounds 
per inquiry to 50. An additional 10% is still added to each 
inquiry when a concern is raised, but since the initial 
inquiry is 50, only five rounds are added.
Results
Figure 3 juxtaposes model 3 to model 2 over 50 000 
rounds for certain whistleblowing rates. Previously, we 
considered the results of the simulation after 10 000 
rounds, but including 50 000 rounds adds clarity to the 
underlying dynamic. Each line represents the average 
number of good practices in the institution over time 
for a given whistleblowing rate. The solid lines depict 
model 2, where the initial inquiry requires 100 rounds. 
The dotted lines depict a more efficient institution where 
inquiries require 50 rounds. The chance of attaining 
information is held static at 100% (i=1), and patient care 
is measured against different rates of speaking-up. The 
square line represents an institution where no one whis-
tleblows (w=0); consequently, the number of good prac-
tices never increase. The other lines represent different 
rates of speaking-up, ranging from 39% (w=0.39) to 
always whistleblowing (w=1). We compared a 39% whis-
tleblowing rate to a 76% whistleblowing rate because such 
rates are grounded in reality. In a large-scale Norwegian 
survey, 76% of those in the public sector who perceived 
wrongdoing raised concerns.19 In similar studies in both 
the UK38 and Australia,44 only 39% of those who observed 
wrongdoing raised concerns. It has been argued that one 
of the reasons for this whistleblowing disparity between 
institutions rests in the efficacy with which the institutions 
handle concerns.19 20
When inquiries require 100 rounds (solid lines), for 
the first 10 000 rounds, patient care improvements are 
hindered by constant whistleblowing. Since high whis-
tleblowing rates result in frequent inquires, the resolu-
tions of existing inquiries are delayed and patient care 
suffers. As a result, a situation where employees do not 
always formally speak up (w<1) outperforms uncondi-
tional speaking-up (w=1). However, although frequent 
speaking up delays inquiries, once the inquiries begin to 
resolve, a higher number of bad practices are corrected. 
In figure 3, for the first 10 000 rounds, 39% whis-
tleblowing (circle line) outperforms 76% (diamond) and 
100% (triangle) whistleblowing. However, after round 
11 693, w=76% overtakes w=39%, demonstrating that the 
reduction in the number of bad practices is improved if 
whistleblowing rates are more frequent. At round 18 009, 
always speaking up (w=100%) passes w=39%, and at round 
28 690, w=100% passes w=76%. The dotted lines in figure 3 
depict model 3 over 50 000 rounds. Clearly, uncondi-
tional whistleblowing (w=1) outperforms all other strate-
gies well before 10 000 rounds. Though it is difficult to see 
in the graph, by round 297, w=100% surpasses w=39%. 
Furthermore, w=100% outperforms w=76% at round 317.
Discussion
It is known that practitioners in institutions with highly 
effective formal review processing are more likely to 
speak up compared with those in less effective institu-
tions. For example, a key principle of the VMMC system, 
described earlier, is that employees receive timely feed-
back on reported concerns, as well as examples of how 
internal speaking-up has led to practice improvements. 
As a result, other employees are encouraged to speak up, 
76% of Norwegian health and education sector employees 
raise concerns when they observe wrongdoing in the 
workplace, a very high proportion compared with whis-
tleblowing in Australia, the USA and UK.19 45 One reason 
for such a high proportion of speaking-up by employees 
is that 83% of Norwegian employees received timely and 
Figure 3 Percentage of good practice when a concern 
is resolved over 50 000 rounds for different whistleblowing 
rates and processing efficiencies. The chance to receive 
information about bad practice is held static at 100% (i=100). 
Solid lines: reviews initially take 100 rounds (model 2). Dotted 
lines: reviews take 50 rounds (model 3). Squares: no one ever 
blows the whistle, w=0. Circles, diamonds and triangles: w is 
39%, 76% and 100%, respectively.
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positive reactions when they raised concerns and 64% 
reported seeing improvements in their workplace after 
concerns were raised. In comparison, the reluctance 
of healthcare employees in the UK to speak up about 
concerns goes hand in hand with reports of staff concerns 
not being responded to by managers and fears about victi-
misation of whistleblowers. For example, a NHS Wales 
survey of clinical and non-clinical staff (n=10 350) shows 
that 54% did not report concerns due to a ‘belief that the 
issue won’t be taken seriously or nothing will get done’46 
(p. 13). A similar trend linking organisational and mana-
gerial response to propensity for staff to report safety 
concerns is described by Howell et al,47 who found that 
hospital managers in England who fed back to staff about 
reported incidents and promoted change had significantly 
higher numbers of reports from employees.47 Hospital 
trusts that were deemed to have punished reporters had 
significantly lower reporting rates.
Model 3 demonstrates that speaking up at a rate of 
39% in an institution that has inefficient and less timely 
responses to dealing with concerns, or speaking up at a 
rate of 76% in a more efficient/timely institution, can 
both be the best strategy for increasing the quality of 
patient care through the removal of bad practices. If the 
employees in inefficient institutions requested inquiries 
at 76% rather than 39%, then large-scale improvements 
to patient care would be significantly delayed. However, if 
the inefficient institution simultaneously increased their 
efficiency and their inquiry rate, then higher speaking-up 
rates would almost immediately feedback into improve-
ments for the patients.
It is important to note that these results occur in the 
limit case where bad practice is never added to the insti-
tution over time—practices only ever improve. If, as in 
the real world, bad practices are occasionally added to 
the system, then this would accentuate our finding. The 
reason that the model’s review process eventually recovers 
from being inundated is that, after a time, there are not 
very many more requested reviews. If bad practices were 
continually added, then this would delay the existing 
reviews even more, increasing the delay in less efficient 
institutions. One could even imagine a world where 
reviews are resolved at a lower rate than bad practice is 
added to system, reducing the aggregate percentage of 
good practice. We did not add bad practices over time 
to this model to demonstrate that the best speaking-up 
strategy can be dependent on an institution’s review effi-
ciency even in the limit case where no bad practices are 
added over time.
One might question the need to consider the early 
stages of institutional improvement, since, given enough 
time, it is eventually beneficial to always speak up (w=1). 
Why not accept that change comes at a cost, and while 
the institution may perform less well for a short period, 
in the end, transparency and whistleblowing lead to the 
best patient care? There is significant evidence that time 
may be a luxury that cannot be afforded. It is known that 
workers who experience delays in the process of handling 
and investigating concerns are often prone to absence 
from work due to physical and mental ill health.38 This all 
costs additional money that creates a feedback loop, nega-
tively impacting patient care and staff morale.38 However, 
by decreasing the length of inquiries by half (from 100 
to 50 rounds), it takes much less than half the time for 
high speaking-up rates to outperform lower rates. There 
is, at least in this simple model, an exponential benefit 
for decreasing the amount of time it takes to process 
inquiries.
In this model, there is always a period of time where 
employees not speaking up outperforms speaking-up; 
however, linear cuts in processing time lead to exponen-
tial cuts in the time where employees not raising concerns 
outperform speaking-up. As a consequence, while it might 
be feasible to accept the slow start to whistleblowing in an 
efficient institution, it might prove less feasible if inqui-
ries take longer to process. This provides further evidence 
that the complex nature of institutions should be studied 
prior to recommending or implementing a strategy of 
carte blanche speaking-up.
Model 4: erroneous whistleblowing
In the previous models, the individual speaking-up always 
correctly diagnosed the valence of a practice. In reality, 
individuals are probably not perfect at uncovering poor 
practice. Occasionally, an employee may believe a good 
practice needs fixing or will not realise the faultiness of a 
poor practice.
Here we consider the effects of classification error in 
speaking-up (e), which is the probability an individual 
will misclassify a practice. If the individual believes a good 
practice is faulty, then, as previously, they will speak up 
with probability w. If the individual incorrectly believes, 
or is coerced into believing a bad practice is good, they 
will ignore it.
Figure 4 Patient care over 50 000 rounds when there is a 
chance e=0.01 that an individual misclassifies the valence 
of a practice. Solid lines: reviews initially take 100 rounds. 
Dotted lines: reviews take 50 rounds. Squares: no one ever 
blows the whistle, w=0. Circles, diamonds and triangles: w is 
39%, 76% and 100%, respectively.
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Results
Figure 4 illustrates the results when there is a 1% chance 
of misclassifying a practice (e=0.01). Comparing figure 4 
with figure 3, it is clear that high speak-up rates take 
even longer to outperform lower rates. When inquiries 
initially require 100 rounds, a 76% whistleblowing rate 
does not outperform a 39% rate until round 17 945. This 
is in contrast to 11 693 rounds in figure 3 when practice 
is never misclassified, which is a 53% increase. An inquiry 
rate of 100% outperforms 76% at round 38 839. This is a 
35% increase compared with figure 3, where it only took 
until round 28 690.
We tested a 1% level of error as the limit case, even 
small levels of errors create dramatic effects. If the chance 
for error is increased, the benefits of high levels of speak-
ing-up decline further. At a 2% rate (e=0.02), a 76% whis-
tleblowing rate does not outperform a 39% rate until 
round 25 514, a 118% increase compared with model 
3. At 5%, it takes until round 63 971, which is a 447% 
increase.
In better functioning, efficient institutions, reporting 
error has less effect on the utility of whistleblowing. When 
the inquiry time is cut in half (dotted lines in figure 4), 
then high levels of speaking-up outperform low levels of 
speaking-up almost immediately. Despite misclassifying 
errors, high levels of speaking-up are quickly advanta-
geous in more efficient institutions.
Discussion
We tested the consequences of small amounts of classi-
fication error on the value of whistleblowing. Including 
only a 1% chance to misclassify a practice led to a signif-
icant decline in the value of high levels of speaking-up. 
In this simple model, if an inefficient institution includes 
individuals with slightly imperfect classification ability, 
then shifting the whistleblowing rate from 39% to 76% 
could hinder patient care for an unacceptably long time. 
Of course, this is a simple model, and the exact interac-
tion of error rates and review efficiency in the real world 
is unknown. However, if such small levels of error can 
generate such dramatic delays in the effectiveness of 
whistleblowing, then it may be unwise to advocate whis-
tleblowing policy without holistically considering the 
underlying organisational topography and the introduc-
tion of practical steps to avoid or reduce misclassifying 
by employees (through training and education, eg, about 
what constitutes good and bad practices; how, when and 
where should concerns about poor practices be commu-
nicated; and the scope for informal and formal speak-
ing-up approaches for various concerns).
Model 5: ineffective inquiries
Resolving concerns in a timely fashion is preferable when 
resources are scarce and employees are increasingly 
speaking-up. Time and resource pressures, allied to prob-
lematic workplace cultures may, however, undermine the 
accuracy of an inquiry. In all of our models up until this 
point, an inquiry has always shifted a bad practice into 
a good practice. In this model, with some probability a 
(accuracy), there is a chance the review erroneously 
deems bad practice to be acceptable. The bad practice is 
then placed back into the pool of practices until someone 
else speaks up and requests a new inquiry into the bad 
practice. Therefore, for each additional inquiry on the 
inquiry stack, there is a 0.001 chance the inquiry will be 
resolved incorrectly, thus accuracy is a = (0.001 * number 
of inquiries); we also restrict a so that it never rises above 
20%.
Result
Figure 5 illustrates the results when e=0.01 and a=0.001. 
Comparing figure 5 with figure 4, the value of high 
speaking-up rates are further delayed. When inquiries 
initially require 100 rounds, a 76% speaking-up rate does 
not outperform a 39% rate until round 26 431. This is 
in contrast to the 17 945 rounds in figure 4 when inqui-
ries always resolved correctly, a 47% increase in time. An 
inquiry rate of 100% outperforms 76% at round 48 099. 
This is a 24% increase compared with figure 4 where it 
only took until round 38 839.
As in model 4, the reduced effectiveness of whis-
tleblowing more or less disappears if inquiries only 
require 50 rounds to complete (dotted lines). Even when 
misclassification errors (e) and inaccurate resolutions (a) 
are combined, efficient reviews generate an environment 
where increased rates of whistleblowing aids patient care.
Discussion
Here we consider the combined effect of inefficiency, 
misclassification errors (e) and inaccurate resolutions (a). 
If the accuracy of judgement is a function of the number 
of inquiries, then the benefits of high whistleblowing 
rates are delayed even further compared with model 4. 
However, for the most part, all of these concerns can 
Figure 5 Patient care over 50 000 rounds when there is 
a e=0.01 chance a worker misclassifies a practice, and a 
a=0.001 * N that inquiries will leave bad practice unchanged. 
Solid lines: reviews initially take 100 rounds. Dotted lines: 
reviews take 50 rounds. Squares: no one ever blows the 
whistle, w=0. Circles, diamonds and triangles: w is 39%, 
76% and 100%, respectively.
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be overcome if enough time and energy is placed into 
reducing the time required to resolve inquiries.
It is important to note that there is little empirical 
data internationally on the accuracy of reviews. However, 
several inquiries in many countries into serious cases of 
institutional shortcomings in healthcare practices have 
demonstrated that internal reviews of employee concerns 
have consistently failed to accurately resolve bad practices 
in a timely way, leading to the proliferation of suboptimal 
care to patients.23 It is also an open question how budget 
and resource constraints may affect the accuracy of 
reviews. However, as with most situations in life, it is not a 
huge leap to suggest that speed and pressed budgets bring 
costs in accuracy. As the number of inquiries increase, the 
speed required to resolve them efficiently may come at a 
cost.
We intentionally selected a small effect size (0.001) to 
compare the effects of inquiry errors in the limit case. 
While the effect size in the real world is unknown, this 
model demonstrates that even small correlations between 
the number of inquiries and the accuracy of reviews can 
significantly affect the utility of whistleblowing. This 
model lends further credence to the need for policy 
makers to consider the interaction between organisational 
topography and whistleblowing. Policy that demands 
speaking up without considering the organisation topog-
raphy may be ineffective or, even worse, harmful.
Model 6: soft, informal speaking-up versus formal speaking-
up channels
Given that we have shown that small organisational 
inefficiencies can dramatically impact the utility of 
whistleblowing practice, what is the best policy for organ-
isations that are currently inefficient? A potential way 
forward is to permit the inclusion of softer mechanisms 
for internal adjustment of healthcare practices.2 There is 
evidence to suggest that in many institutions employees 
may speak up in softer, informal ways,40 48 such as private 
peer-to-peer communication.49 50 Here, we demonstrate 
that, when efficiency cannot be increased, less formal 
ways of speaking up can be advantageous.
Up until now, when a worker was presented with 
poor practice, they were only able to decide whether 
to speak up formally within their organisation. Here 
we introduce a softer mechanism for altering practice. 
Rather than formally speaking up, the employee may 
speak directly to a workplace colleague in an attempt to 
alter their behaviour, without formal internal reporting 
and investigation.
To model this, we add the propensity of an individual 
to employ softer, informal speaking-up channels, s. These 
informal channels may be within professional groups 
(eg, nurse-to-nurse) or between professional groups 
(nurse-to-doctor). As before, when an employee witnesses 
poor practice, they formally speak up with probability w. 
However, if the employee does not formally speak up, 
then they do so informally with probability s. As a result 
of being offered informal advice a colleague may improve 
their previously poor practice.
One of the concerns for permitting and promoting less 
formal speaking up is their lack of transparency. While 
internal investigations may take time, they are more trans-
parent than permitting workers to share information and 
problem-solve without moderation. What happens if the 
advice given to the poor practising agent is not beneficial, 
or even worse, if it further impairs optimum practice?
To analyse the inherent risk of informal speaking up, 
we presume that when someone informs another of bad 
practice, their advice can either (1) improve, (2) worsen 
or (3) not affect the practice. Thus far, each good prac-
tice has increased patient care by 1, and each poor prac-
tice was represented as a 0. Now we add the ability to 
negatively impact patient care with a −1. If a practice is 
improved, then, as in the formal review, the poor prac-
tice (0 or −1) is switched to a good practice=1. If a poor 
practice is worsened, then the practice is switched from a 
0 to a −1 (or if it is already a −1, it remains a −1). Conse-
quently, the practice actually hinders patient care. Finally, 
informally speaking up can be ignored, and the practice 
retains its current value. We presume the chance of each 
output is equally probable (1/3 to improve, worsen and 
not affect). This is in contrast to whistleblowing which, in 
our model, will always result in a positive shift.
Results
Figure 6 compares model 2, where informally speaking up 
is not permitted (solid lines), with an institution where 
workers always speak up informally, s=1 (dotted lines). 
The chance to receive information is held static at i=1 (ie, 
full transparency), and the institution is accurate (a=0) 
and employees do not misclassify (e=0). Patient care is 
measured for different whistleblowing strategies. The 
y-axis is slightly altered compared with previous graphs. 
Figure 6 Comparison of patient care with and without soft 
advice. Patient care over 50 000 rounds where reviews initially 
require 100 rounds. i=1, e=0, a=0. Solid lines: no soft advice, 
s=0 (model 2). Dotted lines: soft advice; s=1. Squares: no one 
ever blows the whistle, w=0. Circles, diamonds and triangles: 
w is 39%, 76%, and 100%, respectively.
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Since, in prior models, good practice=1 and bad prac-
tice=0, the fraction of good practices was the measure of 





Consequently, healthcare is measured by the average 
value of all practices.
According to figure 6, it is beneficial to promote an 
environment where staff speak up informally, even if this 
worsens the practice. If practitioners raise concerns with a 
39% or 76% frequency, then informal speaking up always 
outperforms practitioners who do not. This is demon-
strated by the fact that the dotted line is always higher 
than the solid line for both w=0.39 (circles) and w=0.76 
(diamonds).
If workers always formally speak up (w=1), then infor-
mally speaking up to a colleague offers no benefit. This is 
as expected, since an employee only informally speaks-up 
if they do not formally speak-up, but since they always 
formally speak-up, the potential advantages of informal 
speaking-up are never witnessed. Finally, the dotted 
square lines illustrate that if informal speaking up is used 
without any formal speaking up (w=0), then practices 
improve, though not as much as a mixture of informal 
and formal speaking-up channels.
Discussion
Despite the trepidation of unmonitored and informal 
speaking up, in this simple model, it is almost always 
beneficial to permit informal channels for speaking up. 
However, it is important to note that in figure 6, there 
is an equal chance that informally speaking up will 
help, harm and not affect practice. If the likelihood of 
harmful advice is increased, then the benefits of informal 
speaking up may diminish or be eliminated (see online 
supplementary material C figure 7 and 8). This further 
establishes the need to consider the dynamics of the insti-
tution prior to instantiating whistleblowing policy. While 
it seems unlikely that professional advice would prove 
more likely to harm than help, such mechanisms play a 
significant force in selecting the best policy.
Importantly, in figure 6, it is the mixture of formal 
and informal speaking-up that performs best. Whenever 
speaking up is not fully ubiquitous (w<1), then a combina-
tion of informal and formal speaking-up performs better 
than formal speaking-up in isolation. This is true over all 
rounds. Furthermore, this means that while formal speak-
ing-up eventually surpasses informal speaking-up strat-
egies, it requires more time. When the whistleblowing 
rate is 76% (dotted and diamond line), unconditional 
whistleblowing (w=1) only surpasses it when almost all 
practices are optimum. Thus, waiting for the benefits 
of formally speaking up may not be worth delaying the 
immediate improvement to healthcare given a mixture 
of softer/informal speaking-up and harder/formal speak-
ing-up channels. If inefficiencies in processing cannot be 
overcome, informal speaking-up may augment formal 
speaking-up in generating improved patient care. This 
concurs with conclusions reached in a recently published 
large qualitative analysis of 165 employees in three NHS 
England organisations, which states that if organisations 
value less formal and softer insights as a means of sensing 
problems proactively, they may require approaches to 
accessing employee concerns that are less pervaded by 
formality.50
GenerAl DIsCussIOn
The need for healthcare organisations to support and 
respond to employees who speak up about shortcom-
ings in care has become increasingly prioritised in 
the UK38 and internationally.51 This has occurred as a 
result of evidence that suggests that organisations where 
employees freely speak up about concerns, and where 
those concerns are responded to in a supportive way, are 
associated with better patient outcomes52 and staff well-
being.53 Organisations therefore reap significant bene-
fits when staff are adequately listened and responded to, 
including: improved patient safety and patient experi-
ence, reduced costs and improved staff morale.54
In this work, we argue that subtle and small perturba-
tions in a healthcare system may lead to significant alter-
ations in the best policy for maximising the improvement 
of patient care through speaking up. By adding 10% inter-
dependence between review processing time, we find that 
low speaking-up rates and a lack of transparency can, para-
doxically, outperform transparency and high speaking-up 
rates (see model 2). Furthermore, even tiny amounts 
of employee error (model 4) or inaccuracy in resolving 
inquiries (model 5) significantly diminish the utility of 
speaking up. While the benefits of not speaking up do 
not hold in perpetuity (see models 3–5), for a given insti-
tution it may be long enough to prove salient, altering 
the best strategy for improving patient care. However, if 
inquiry time is reduced (see models 3–5), then this effect 
may prove small enough that the initial penalties for 
speaking up may be weathered and the future benefits of 
a transparent institution enjoyed.
We then analysed a method for increasing patient care 
quality when efficiency cannot be raised in isolation. We 
found that softer, informal mechanisms for correcting 
poor practices can help overcome some of the difficulties 
generated by institutional inefficiencies. While unmon-
itored advice seems risky, we showed that a mixture 
of informal and formal speaking-up channels leads 
to improved patient care. While the fidelity of formal 
internal institutional whistleblowing reporting and inqui-
ries is valuable, it is cost prohibitive. Cheap, timely and 
informal but less transparent and possibly accurate chan-
nels for speaking-up, mixed with more accurate, formal 
but costly channels leads to excellent patient care.
Recently, a call was put forth to use the strengths 
of computational modelling to better understand the 
healthcare service.39 Given the speed at which modelling 
can diagnose potential problems with the instantiation of 
policy, we agree with this call and believe that modelling 
can act as a ‘first defence’ in trying to understand the 
repercussions of policy change. To our knowledge, the 
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present work represents one of the first attempts to use 
computational models to better understand the effects of 
policy on speaking-up rates.
It is worth noting that while this work has focused on 
how different speaking-up rates compare with each other 
in a variety of environments, these models also demon-
strate how much institutional nuances can alter the effec-
tiveness of a given speaking-up rate. For instance, when 
the speaking-up rate is 100%, and reviews require 100 
rounds, then it takes the following number of rounds to 
reach 95% good practice: model 1: 14 950, model 2 (10% 
increase): 24 280, model 4 (error rate): 29 710; model 5 
(misclassification): 35 019. It is clear that the efficiency 
and effectiveness of an organisation can drastically alter 
the speed at which practice improves. For instance, if 
a very small amount of error and misclassification is 
added to the review process (model 5), this can delay the 
time required to reach 95% good practice by over 40% 
compared with the unrealistic perfect review process in 
model 2. Organisational efficiency and accuracy will likely 
play a key role in the success of speaking-up policy.
It is important, however, to discuss a major limitation in 
computational modelling—the simplicity of the model. 
No model can replicate the complexities of a working 
healthcare system. As the statistician George Box once 
said, ‘all models are wrong, but some are useful’.55 We have 
taken several assumptions from empirical data and shown 
that there is a system where concurrent review processing 
can impede the effectiveness of reviews so much that it 
is advantageous for the system to reduce the number of 
reviews. Does a given healthcare organisation operate in 
the space of this model, such that increasing reviews can 
impede good practice? We do not know. However, since 
such a space exists, we believe it is imperative to check 
whether existing healthcare organisations are vulnerable 
when enacting new policy.
Another potential limitation of this work is our use of 
the concurrent review process. Existing review processes 
are complex and often very specific to the organisation. 
Here, we sought to understand the consequences of 
trying to balance reviews concurrently. Future work could 
include a review process for a particular organisation that 
might blend the concurrent review process shown here, 
with both a queue-based system and a method for priori-
tising reviews. A model could easily be run to understand 
the repercussions of whistleblowing policy on the nuances 
of a specific review process.
It is also imperative to note that the models presented 
here only touch on a few mechanisms that could inhibit 
the utility of whistleblowing policy on patient care. We 
wished to demonstrate how small perturbations in institu-
tional dynamics can lead to significant equilibrium shifts. 
By adding 10% delays to whistleblowing inquiries with 
small amounts of misclassification and inaccurate reso-
lutions, we found that not speaking up and obfuscated 
information were actually beneficial to the improvement 
of patient care for long periods of time. We could have 
included even more roadblocks to resolving inquiries. 
For instance, given a static budget, whistleblowing reviews 
might actually hinder the care patients receive; if the insti-
tution is spending money on reviewing, it cannot spend 
money on additional patient needs. Furthermore, if a 
policy or guideline is created because of care failings in 
one institution, should other well-operating institutions 
be forced to comply with the new policy? The dexterity 
required to implement new policies may be non-trivial, 
potentially creating more problems than they solve. Also, 
this work did not consider organisational (as opposed to 
individual) learning. In the above models, informal and 
formal mechanisms for speaking up altered individual 
behaviour, but disseminating the need for behaviour 
change throughout the organisation adds another layer 
of complexity and viscosity. There are a number of ways 
in which the costs of whistleblowing may prove inhibitive, 
we explained three of these.
It is also known that not all organisations respond 
in the same way when their employees speak up about 
concerns. Similarly, within organisations, not all recip-
ients of concerns are the same; some are more willing 
and/or able to take more effective ‘hearer’ action than 
others.56 We call for more research into ‘hearer courage’, 
to understand which managers have the courage to hear, 
under which circumstances, and with regard to which 
wrongs. Employees’ perceptions that concerns are largely 
ignored, or only partially acted on, has led to a lack of 
confidence with existing processes.2 38 40
Given that health systems internationally have experi-
enced difficulty in responding to employees’ patient safety 
concerns, significantly more research and theory is needed 
to diagnose a holistic understanding of how the utility of 
whistleblowing relates to the complexities of healthcare 
institutions. In particular, a better understanding of the 
pre-existing context within which organisational initia-
tives and changes attempt to alter speaking-up cultures, 
practices and processes is needed. We recommend the 
use of implementation theories, such as normalisation 
process theory, which offers a robust conceptual frame-
work to understand how complex interventions and their 
ensemble of related material and cognitive practices, 
gradually become normalised, or not, in specific social 
contexts.57 The present work calls into question the a 
priori belief that speaking up improves patient care and 
suggests that given resource constraints, whistleblowing 
policies should seek to understand the complex rela-
tionship between accuracy, efficiency, soft advice and the 
utility of speaking up. We hope continued research will 
aid in explaining how organisational complexities affect 
the utility of whistleblowing, leading to improved patient 
care. Furthermore, we join the recent call (see ref 39) in 
hoping that work such as this leads to further utilisation 
of the relatively untapped resource of modelling tech-
niques into expediting and validating healthcare policy 
conversation.
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